| La sussidiarietà (verticale) come “precetto di ottimizzazione” e come criterio ordinatore |
| Fascicolo 2002-4 |
| Scritto da Chessa Omar |
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Sommario 1. Premessa. – 2. Il principio costituzionale di sussidiarietà come “precetto di ottimizzazione”. – 3. Sussidiarietà versus competenza? – 4. Ordinamento italiano e competenze concorrenti “alla tedesca”. – 5. Sussidiarietà verticale, dottrina dei “poteri impliciti” e multilevel constitution.
Abstract The object of this essay is the conceptual and normative structure of the “vertical” subsidiarity in european and national systems. The point of departure is the position of the subsidiarity between the norms that have structure of “principles”: the subsidiarity works as a “precept of optimization” (Alexy) and not as a “rule”. This structure influences deeply on the canon of “competence” – as it could be observed in european and national dimensions – and also transforms foundations and modus operandi of “emplied powers” in the relationships between the different levels of government. |