| Il dibattito sui diritti collettivi delle minoranze culturali. Un adeguamento delle premesse teoriche |
| Fascicolo 2001-1 |
| Scritto da Torbisco Neus |
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Sommario 1. Introduzione. – 2. Il progressivo riconoscimento dei diritti collettivi: genesi di una polemica. – 2.1 Alcune considerazioni preliminari. – 2.2. Multiculturalismo e diritti collettivi. – 3. L’opposizione liberale al riconoscimento dei diritti collettivi. – 3.1. La nozione di diritti collettivi. – 3.2. Le principali obiezioni. – 4. Le giustificazioni alternative alla teoria dei diritti collettivi. – 5.L’inadeguatezza della prospettiva dominante. – 6. Una nuova impostazione teorica. – 6.1. La strategia “reduccionista”. – 6.2. Diritti collettivi come diritti a beni pubblici. – 7. La rilevanza dell’approccio. Alcune conclusioni provvisorie.
Abstract Liberal democratic states are today faced with a crucial challenge: how to accommodate national and ethnic minority demands for the so-called «collective rights», while preserving constitutionally-recognised individual civil and political rights. The liberal tradition is having difficulties in coming to terms with this question. This paper argues that, although there are substantial reasons that might justify the liberal concern, the prevailing approach to the problem of minority rights includes certain problematic assumptions that are unhelpful in resolving the main issues involved. After explaining where the inadequacy lies, it is suggested that the progress of the debate depends on adopting a theoretical framework based on both different conceptual and substantive premises. In particular, some possible alternatives to the predominant notion of collective rights are explored. This modification constitutes an essential preliminary step towards correctly assessing the implications of defending the protection of some minority groups through collective rights. |