| IV. Forma di Stato comunitario, sovranità e principio di sovranazionalità: una difficile sintesi |
| Fascicolo 2003-3 |
| Scritto da Toniatti Roberto |
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Sommario 1. Il principio di sovranazionalità e la clausola europea quale dato indefettibile della forma di Stato comunitario. – 2. L’incerta innovatività della proposta di revisione dell’art. 11 Cost. quale clausola europea originaria. – 2.1. (Segue): in relazione alle dinamiche dell’integrazione europea. – 2.2. (Segue): in relazione al criterio della parità con gli altri Stati. – 2.3. (Segue): in relazione ai principi supremi dell’ordinamento. – 2.4. (Segue): in relazione al principio democratico. – 2.5. (Segue): in relazione al principio di sussidiarietà. – 3. La criticabile innovatività della proposta di revisione dell’art. 11 Cost. sotto il profilo sistematico. – 3.1. (Segue): in relazione alle ulteriori limitazioni di sovranità. – 3.2. (Segue): in relazione all’origine storica e alla funzionalità successiva dell’art. 11. – 4. Il previsto requisito della maggioranza assoluta. – 5. Il previsto referendum confermativo obbligatorio e la sua ratio di potenziale delegittimazione degli organi di indirizzo politico. – 6. Conclusioni: la razionalizzazione della clausola europea delle Costituzioni degli Stati membri quale garanzia della “forma di Stato” dell’Unione europea.
Abstract A proposal of constitutional amendment – with the purpose of declaring (i) that Italian participation to the process of European integration is bound to respecting its own fundamental principles and inviolable human rights; (ii) that Italy promotes and favours the development of the European Union inasmuch as the latter is ordered in a way that includes the democratic principle as well as the principle of subsidiarity; and (iii) of establishing that “any further limitation of sovereignty” must be approved by an absolute majority of Parliament and by a subsequent mandatory referendum which requires actual voting by the majority of entitled voters – is analysed in detail, focusing on the prevailing vagueness and lack of legal precision and underlying some problems of interpretation of the proposed new text. Moreover, acknowledging previous and further limitations to member States’ sovereignty is criticised, as European integration implies rather a transfer of the exercise of sovereign power – through participation to the composition and functioning of EU institutions – and ultimately an expanded new supranational dimension of member States’ sovereignty, indeed the dimension which seems to be adequate and necessary in our time. The present «Europe clause» of the Italian Constitution (art. 11) – although its historical origins were not meant to include European integration - has so far been interpreted so as to allow both Italian participation to the process (therefore providing a domestic source ensuring the primacy of EC law) as well as the recognition by the Constitutional Court of the priority of Italian rules on fundamental rights and republican principles (therefore contributing to the recognition of fundamental rights by the European Court of Justice and subsequently by art. 6 of TEU). Preferably a revised constitutional «Europe clause» ought to rationalise Italian (and other member States’) status as a «Community State» only when the current attempts of constitutionalisation of the EU have reached a safe harbour. |