Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo

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L'Associazione nasce nel 2001 con la finalità di promuovere il dibattito fra studiosi ed operatori del diritto in ambito nazionale ed internazionale, con particolare attenzione al metodo comparatistico.

Quale tutela penale dell’ambiente? Nuove prescrizioni europee e proposte di riforma in Italia
Fascicolo 2005-1
Scritto da Siracusa Licia   

Sommario

1. Prospettive ed ostacoli per una competenza dell’Unione europea in materia di diritto penale ambientale. – 1.1. La tutela dell’ambiente: una moderna frontiera per il diritto penale e per la politica criminale europea. – 1.2. La questione degli strumenti per armonizzare il diritto penale dell’ambiente in ambito europeo. – 1.3. Ricorso alla decisione-quadro: una soluzione preferibile alla luce del principio di riserva di legge penale e dei requisiti delle fattispecie previste. – 1.4. Riserva di legge e obblighi di penalizzazione di fonte europea nella giurisprudenza costituzionale e comunitaria. – 1.5. I Requisiti delle fattispecie incriminatrici: rinunzia al rinvio mobile. – 1.6. La prospettiva aperta dal Trattato che adotta la Costituzione europea. L’esclusione dei crimini contro l’ambiente dalla futura cooperazione in materia di diritto penale sostanziale. – 2. Il profilo dell’offesa. – 2.1. Scelta di tutela del bene giuridico ambientale. – 2.2. La struttura dell’illecito. – 3. Un primo banco di prova degli effetti e dei limiti delle prescrizioni europee in rapporto al diritto interno: la proposta di depenalizzazione di alcuni reati ambientali del Ministro della giustizia Castelli.

 

Abstract

The reconstruction of Europe accomplished in Maastricht and which continued in Amsterdam has established new outlines in the process of harmonisation of criminal legislation in the E.U. member states, even in the area of crimes related to the defence of the environment. In particular, two different juridical proposals have been presented in order to reach a certain level of approximation of environmental crimes within the European Union: the draft Directive adopted by the Commission on 13th March 2001 and the draft Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27th January 2003. Europe has finally opted for the second of the two, which was finally approved in January2003. A framework decision, instead of a directive, is more compatible with the principle of the rule of law (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali) in the criminal affairs, since the framework decision does not impose strict obligations of criminalisation on the member states, which would infringe the principle of legality. However, the adoption of a framework decision would appear to breach the rules governing the division of powers between the European Community and the Union due to the fact that the protection of the environment is not included in the third pillar which is the subject of harmonisation measures in the field of criminal law, according to the provisions of the EU Treaty. This institutional conflict is the object of a petition that the Commission recently lodged in the Court of Justice. While awaiting the decision of the European Court, many still believe that the third pillar remains the area for the harmonisation of criminal law at least until the power to make new criminal offences is not entirely attributed to the European Parliament, the only body which truly represents the will of EU citizens. In this respect, no substantial changes will come from the European Constitution which does not attribute to the Parliament an effective power of harmonisation in the area of criminal law and does not solve the lack of democracy in the European legislative process. Moreover, the new Constitution replaces the framework decision with a new legislative instrument, the “European framework law”, similar to the old directive. By imposing an express obligation of criminalisation on the member states, this European framework law will inevitably be in contrast with the criminal principle of legality and the case law of the Constitutional Court which has always deplored the excess flexibility of the above mentioned principle.