Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo

Sommario

1. Obiettivi del nuovo sistema comunitario di preferenze tariffarie generalizzate. – 2. Il nuovo regime speciale d’incentivazione per lo sviluppo sostenibile e il buon governo. – 2.1. (Segue): Obiettività e maggior onerosità delle condizioni da soddisfare per beneficiare degli incentivi speciali. – 2.2. (Segue): Riduzioni tariffarie maggiori previste dal nuovo regime speciale. – 2.3. (Segue): Maggiore attenzione alla tutela dei diritti umani rispetto alle altre componenti dello sviluppo sostenibile “integrale”? – 3. La prassi relativa alla concessione degli incentivi tariffari ulteriori. – 4. La revoca temporanea delle preferenze tariffarie nel caso di mancato rispetto di determinati obblighi internazionali. – 4.1. (Segue): La procedura di revoca delle preferenze. – 4.2. (Segue): La prassi relativa alla revoca temporanea delle preferenze: in particolare, in presenza di violazioni dei diritti fondamentali dei lavoratori. – 5. Scarsa efficacia dei meccanismi di revoca temporanea delle preferenze tariffarie. – 6. Scarsa attrattività dei regimi speciali ieri ed oggi.

Abstract

This article analyses the European Council regulation (EC) No 980/2005, applying a new scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 2006 to 2015. Particular attention will be paid to the new special incentive scheme for sustainable development and good governance that will replace the previous special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights, the environment, and the special provisions for combating drug production and trafficking. The adoption of this special regime will undoubtedly make the normative preference framework simpler. On the other hand, it will put more pressure on developing and least developed countries to adopt and effectively implement contemporary national policies aimed at fostering either the respect of human rights, or environmental protection and fighting against political corruption, drug production and trafficking. Indeed, these purposes are now tightly interconnected under the umbrella of the “integral concept of sustainable development”. This approach involves a heavier burden of proof for States interested in obtaining special tariff preferences than in the past. In fact, the requesting countries have to ratify and effectively implement a long list of multilateral treaties, and accept regular monitoring and review mechanisms provided in these treaties. Linking the grant of special tariff benefits to international standards, the European Community appears to follow the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendation to grant trade preferencesaccording to objective standards. However, as the article will show, such higher international standards risk dissuading States from using the opportunities offered by the special scheme, even if tariff preferences are more advantageous and attractive than in the past. In this way, the aim of promoting an integral sustainable development could remain only a good intention, as the limited number of requesting States is demonstrating. The scanty efficiency of this promotional tool seems to be confirmed by a not credible system of temporary preferences withdrawal in the case of breaches of human rights, environmental and good governance conventions. Indeed, the new regulation has not modified the procedure for withdrawing tariff preferences provided in the previous regulation. This continues to be too long because, in the Community’s perspective, the withdrawal of tariff preferences as a “sanction” against States that do not promote an integral sustainable development policy, is conceived as an extrema ratio.