Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo

Sommario

1. Introduzione. − 2. Il fatto. − 3.1. Res giudicata. Sentenze di accertamento e responsabilità degli Stati. − 3.2. Sentenze di condanna ex art. 41 CEDU. − 3.3. Portata generale delle decisioni della Corte europea. − 4. La soluzione del BVerfG. − 4.1. Obbligo per tutti gli organi dello Stato. − 4.2. L’obbligo “di considerazione” e gli “ordinamenti parziali”. − 4.2.1. Gli “ordinamenti parziali” come concretizzazione dei “principi fondamentali” della Costituzione. − 4.2.2. Principi fondamentali, sovranità e valori. − 4.3. Una nuova Verfassungsbeschwerde per Görgülu. − 4.4. Ammissibilità della Verfassungsbeschwerde per mancato rispetto dell’“ obbligo di considerazione”. – 5. Conclusioni.

Abstract

This article deals with the Görgülu judgement delivered by the German Federal Constitutional Court on October 14, 2004, highlighting the relevancy of the execution of decisions of the ECHR in domestic law for a multilevel protection of fundamental rights in Europe. It argues that the judgement may enhance the cooperation between national courts and the ECHR, notwithstanding some remarks on dualism as the framing model for the relation between international and municipal law associated with a constitutional reservation in the matter of fundamental rights. In dealing with art. 46 ECHR relating to the binding effect of decisions of the ECHR, the GFCC draws consistently from the principles of international law regarding state responsibility as interpreted by both the ECHR in its case law and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The GFCC states that judgements of the ECHR undoubtedly bind the national judiciary, which has a legal “duty to take (them) into consideration” (Berücksichtigungspflicht). More importantly, such a duty goes beyond the scope of application of art. 46 ECHR and applies to case law from the ECHR in general. The GFCC stresses its role as a guarantor of the enforcement of international law within the German legal order. As a consequence, it provides the individual for the first time with a constitutional remedy to enforce, albeit indirectly, violations of the ECHR. The concerned individual can raise a complaint under the German Basic Law, arguing that the respective fundamental rights together with the principle of the rule of law (art. 20 GG) have been violated. However, the statement of the GFCC, according to which fundamental principles of the Basic Law concretely take form in some subsystems of municipal private law, is less convincing. Indeed, it raises concerns both practically, since it could substantially impair the domestic impact of the case-law of the ECHR, and theoretically, because it might suggest a misleading analogy to the doctrine of constitutional limits to the EC/EU integration, which is not straightforwardly applicable to the ECHR.