Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo

Sommario

1. Introduzione. La riforma del riparto delle competenze con la revisione costituzionale del 2006 tra retorica ed effettività. – 2. Federalismo e asimmetria: una relazione inscindibile. – 3. La forzata uniformità del sistema federale tedesco e le ragioni del suo superamento. – 4. Il nuovo riparto delle competenze. Un equivoco di fondo? – 4.1. (Segue): In particolare: la tripartizione della competenza legislativa concorrente. – (Segue): 4.2. Cos’è cambiato davvero? – 5. Valutazioni conclusive.

Abstract

The main goal of the German constitutional reform of 2006 was to reduce the power of the Bundesrat in the federal legislative procedure. This has been achieved by means of a complex redesigning of the distribution of legislative powers between the Federation and the Länder. This paper describes the new scheme, within the framework of the most recent evolutions of the German federal system and of its problems. It argues that the reform is technically sophisticated and all in all sustainable. However, it was not successful in pursuing a simplification of the structure of power – rather the opposite – and it is based on the myth according to which a clear-cut division of legislative powers between the Federation and the sub-national entities is possible and desirable.